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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, litigation and legislation have increasingly
focused on state and county government medical assistance programs. State
and local government indigent care budgets have been strained due to in-
creased unemployment, tax revenue declines, rapidly spiralling health care
costs, and changes in federal government health insurance program reim-
bursement mechanisms. Increased competition and cost containment ef-
forts have altered the traditional cost shifting system of private payors
subsidizing indigent care that is not reimbursed by federal, state, or local
governments.'
* The opinions, interpretations, suggestions, and conclusions expressed in this
manuscript are those of the author and should not be attributed to the National
Health Law Program or Cigna Health Plans. This article will be republished with
the permission of the JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH in the 1990 Second Edition
of the NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM MANUAL ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE FOR INDIGENTS.
** B.S., Pharmacy, Purdue University 1980; J.D., Indiana University, Bloom-
ington 1982. The author, formerly a staff attorney with the National Health Law
Program, is Corporate Counsel for Cigna Health Plans of California in Glendale,
CA.
' Hadley & Feder, Hospital Cost Shifting and Care for the Uninsured, 4 HEALTH
AFF. 67 (1985) [hereinafter Hadley & Feder].
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The number of persons who lack health insurance has increased by
34.7% since 1977.2 The health status of the poor is in extreme jeopardy.
According to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 15% of the uninsured
families in 1982 needed medical care but did not receive it.' In California,
state reductions in financing care for medically indigent adults resulted
in greatly reduced access to necessary care and was directly attributed to
the deaths of four Los Angeles County indigents.4 Patients with chronic
illness suffered significant hardship and rapid deterioration of health
status.
5
Public concern with rising taxes and other increased budgetary
priorities have caused reductions in medical assistance program funding
when the need for indigent care is at its highest. Budgetary limitations
give state or local governments incentive to implement numerous imper-
missible changes, such as: (1) use of more restrictive eligibility criteria for
medical assistance; (2) reduction in the types of services provided; (3)
"streamlined" program administrative procedures; and (4) reduced pro-
vider reimbursement fees. Hospitals are under pressure to contain costs
in order to meet limits under the Medicare prospective payment system
and other prudent purchasers and, thus, are unable to provide indigent
care through cross-subsidization of private payors.6 Numerous hospitals
have adopted stringent patient admission policies, as health advocates note
that private facilities have begun "cherry-picking" or skimming off pa-
tients who are able to pay and "dumping" patients, who cannot pay or
who underpay, onto understaffed and underequipped public facilities.'
This article will provide an overview of the extent to which state and
local government entities must provide medical care for the poor and ways
to enforce these obligations.
' Address by Margaret Solvetta & Katherine Swartz, National Health Policy
Forum at George Washington University, Washington, D.C. (June 1986).1 ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, UPDATED REPORT ON ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 1 (1983).
' Lurie, Ward, Shapiro & Brook, Termination from Medi-Cal - Does It Affect
Health? 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 480 (1984); Lurie, Ward, Shapiro, Gallego,
Vaghaiwalla & Brook, Termination of Medi-Cal Benefits - A Follow-Up Study One
Year Later, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1266 (1986).
5Id.
6 See Hadley & Feder, supra note 1.
' Annas, Your Money or Your Life: Dumping Uninsured Patients from Hospital
Emergency Wards, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 74 (1986); Bernard, Patient Dumping:
A Resident's Firsthand View, NEW PHYSICIAN, Oct. 1985, at 23; Frank, Dumping
the Poor- Private Hospitals Risk Suits, A.B.A. J., Oct. 15, 1984, at 25; Friedman,
The Dumping Dilemma: The Poor are Always with Some of Us, 56 Hosp. 51 (1982);
Friedman, The Dumping Dilemma, 56 Hosp. 75 (1982); Himmelsteing, Woolhandler,
Harnly, Bader, Silber, Backer & Jones, Patient Transfers: Medical Practice as Social
Triage, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494 (1984); Schiff, Ansell, Scholsser, Idris, Morrison
& Whitman, Transfers to a Public Hospital, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 552 (1986);
Taylor, Ailing, Uninsured, and Turned Away. Americans Without Health Coverage
Finding Hospital Doors Closed, Washington Post, June 30, 1985, at 1, col. 1;
Hospitals in Cost Squeeze 'Dump' More Patients Who Can't Afford to Pay Bills,
Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1985, Sec. 2, at 1.
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II. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
There is no federal constitutional right to medical care.' State and local
government obligations to provide medical care for the poor are derived
from state statutes and constitutions. Ideally, statutory or constitutional
provisions state clear, express, and mandatory obligations to provide
medical assistance to the poor. In actuality, state medical assistance pro-
gram statutes or constitutional provisions lack specific guidelines and tend
to be rather generalized and imprecise, leading to broad variations in
benefit coverage, eligibility standards, and program administrations. Not
surprisingly, when state and local governments adopt their own interpreta-
tions of the statutes' meaning, the governmental entities attempt to in-
sulate themselves by narrow interpretations that avoid or limit their
statutory duties.
Courts are often asked to determine the extent of governmental obliga-
tions, or to make judicial determinations of the legal effect of vague or am-
biguous medical assistance statutes. The vagueness of these, sometimes
antiquated, poor-relief statutes has contributed to inconsistent judicial
interpretations of similar issues. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court
has declared that the Idaho Medically Indigent Acts are
[plossessed of... the most "inartful draftsmanship"... Very lit-
tle within the statues is clear .... Only a complete redrafting
of these acts will ever satisfactorily clear up the numerous am-
biguities and inconsistencies which the acts have
created .... Until that millenial day, however, we are obligated
to give meaning to the act in a rational and reasonable man-
ner, a not altogether easy task.'
Delineation of specific medical assistance program responsibilities re-
quires careful review of the legislative intent and statutory purpose.
Remedies for state or local failure to meet statutory or constitutional obliga-
tions to provide indigent medical care will be discussed in the enforcement
section.
A. Statutory Provisions
The duty to provide indigent medical care is most often found in state
statutes. The statutes typically impose responsibility on cities or counties,
municipalities, special welfare districts, townships, or the state govern-
'See Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hospital, Inc., 826 F.2d 1030 (11th
Cir. 1987) (no duty based on either the federal constitution or statutes to require
states or counties to provide medical care for the medically indigent); see also Har-
ris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (no constitutional right to have an abortion
funded); Elliot v. Ehrlich, 203 Neb. 790, 280 N.W.2d 637, 641 (1979) (welfare benefits
are not a fundamental right, and neither the state nor the federal government is
under any constitutional obligation to guarantee the minimum levels of support).
' East Shoshone Hosp. Dist. v. Nonini, 109 Idaho 937, 938, 942, 712 P.2d 638,
639, 643 (1985) (Citation omitted).
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ment. When state legislatures have created a mandatory duty to provide
indigent medical care, they frequently use the word "shall" or "must" to
clarify the non-discretionary nature of the duty. Ordinarily, the use of the
word "shall" or "must" in a statute carries with it the presumption that
they are used in the mandatory rather than discretionary sense. Use of
the words "may", "is authorized to", or "can" creates an opposite presump-
tion. But neither is a conclusive presumption.
Since governmental officials are subject to a high degree of responsibili-
ty for the care of the indigent sick, relevant statutes should be accorded
a mandatory construction."' Characterizing a statute as mandatory or per-
missive determines what legal effect should be given its provisions. Courts
generally will not compel a governmental entity to provide medical
assistance based on a statute that is permissive rather than mandatory."
Nearly every state has a statutory provision which authorizes or mandates
state or local governments to provide medical care for the poor.' 2 Section
17000 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code provides that:
Every county and every city and county shall relieve and sup-
port all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those in-
capacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident
therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved by
their relatives or friends, or by their own means, or by state
hospitals or state or private institutions. 13
This provision imposes a mandatory duty upon cities and counties to pro-
vide medically necessary health care to indigent California residents. In
contrast, the Arizona Revised Code § 11-297 merely states that: "The board
of supervisors, under such limitations and restrictions as are prescribed
by law may:... provide for the care and maintenance of the indigent sick
of the county ...."" Although the language used in the Arizona statute
is permissive, the Arizona Supreme Court has consistently held that the
county obligation to provide medical care for the poor is mandatory. 5
"Town of City of Peoria v. Rauschkolb, 333 Ill. App. 411, 78 N.E. 2d 123 (1948);
Male v. Pompton Lakes Borough Municipal Authority, 105 N.J. Super. 348, 252
A.2d 224 (1969); Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y. 2d 1, 371 N.E. 2d 449, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 728
(1977); Speed v. Blum, 97 Misc. 2d 163,410 N.Y.S. 2d 970 (1978); Multnomah County
v. Luihn, 180 Ore. 528, 178 P.2d 159 (1947); Town of Randolp v. Ketchum, 117
Vt. 468, 94 A.2d 410 (1953).
" See, e.g., Perth Amboy Gen. Hosp. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 158 N.J.
Super. 556, 386 A.2d 900 (1978) (statute which authorized counties to make
payments to hospitals providing care to indigents did not require counties to do so).
12 See generally M. DOWELL, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM MANUAL ON STATE
AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE FOR INDIGENTS (1985)
[hereinafter M. DOWELL].
'3 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1980).
'4 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-297 (1985).
"Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 91 Ariz. 35, 369 P.2d 271 (1962); Industrial
Comm'n v. Navajo County, 64 Ariz. 172, 167 P.2d 113 (1946) (In each case, the
Arizona Supreme Court interpreted two statutes authorizing counties to care for
the indigent sick and to make appropriations for care "as the supervisors ... deem
necessary and adequate" to impose a mandatory duty to provide medical care for
the poor.).
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Some states have statutory provisions that do not explicitly mention
medical care for indigents, but authorize or mandate state or local govern-
ments to provide for "relief', "support", or "maintenance" of the poor.'6
Courts have generally interpreted such statutes to include the provision
of medical care." At a minimum, those words mean that the government
is responsible to provide or make available all services that are necessary
for survival.
Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the
legislature must be given effect. 8 Courts will give effect to every word,
clause and sentence of a statute, where possible. 19 Where a statute makes
it the duty of the state or local government to provide for indigent per-
sons, that duty is mandatory and must be complied with strictly.2" A man-
datory statute cannot be ignored due to insufficient government funds,2'
nor may program administrators establish impermissible restrictions on
eligibility or scope of available services."
Statutes of authorization are essentially permissive but are viewed as
mandatory if such was the intention of the legislature in enacting the
statute.22 The legislative history of the indigent care statutory provision
may be an important aid in determining whether the legislature intend-
ed the statute to be mandatory or discretionary.2 4 Legislative intent may
be ascertained by determining the objective to be achieved by the statute
and considering the consequences which would result from construing the
statute as mandatory or permissive. The mandatory or permissive distinc-
tion is also important in the context of the amount, duration, and scope
of medical care required to be provided. The extent of state or local govern-
ment obligations depends on the express terms of the statute, legislative
intent, and judicial interpretations of the provisions.25 As noted by the Kan-
sas Supreme Court: "Consideration must be given to the legislative history,
the language of the statute, its subject matter, the importance of its provi-
sions [and] their relation to the general object intended to be accomplished
by the act . ,,"126 Statutory use of permissive words such as "may",
16 See generally M. DOWELL, supra note 12.
" In re Larson, 215 Minn. 599, 11 N.W.2d 145 (1943); Jerauld County v. St.
Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 76 S.D. 1, 71 N.W.2d 571 (1955).
"' SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 8 46.01-46.07 (4th ed. 1985) [hereinafter
SUTHERLAND].
19 Id. at § 45.01.
20 See Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669,483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971);
Williams v. Shapiro, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 449, 234 A.2d 376 (1967); Wayne Township
v. Lutheran Hosp., 160 Ind. App. 427, 312 N.E.2d 120 (1974); Lawson v. Shuart,
323 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1971); State ex. rel. Artega v. Silverman, 56 Wisc. 2d 110, 201
N.W.2d 538 (1972).
21 See supra note 18; see also infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
22 See generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 18, at § 45.01-.15.
23 See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Wilcox v. Billings, 200 Kan. 654, 438 P.2d 108 (1968).
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"authorized", or "empowered" create a mandatory obligation when the
requisite duty is imposed upon public officials and their acts are for the
benefit of the poor.27
Courts tend to favor mandatory interpretation unless it is absolute-
ly clear that the legislature meant the statute to be permissive.2 8 Statutes
enacted to relieve the poor are generally accorded liberal construction with
a view towards the accomplishment of beneficient objectives.29 Even if the
statute is adjudged permissive, it cannot be ignored at will. When review-
ing discretionary conduct of government officials, courts will uphold the
official conduct unless they find that it is inconsistent or in conflict with
the statute, or that it is unreasonable or arbitrary and capricious. Even
with discretionary provisions, courts lean towards a liberal construction
of statutes so that remedial statutory purposes may be achieved. Am-
biguous statutes may also be interpreted by reference to related state
statutes or similar statutes of other states.
B. Constitutional Provisions
Fifteen states have constitutional provisions which authorize or man-
date the provision of medical care for the poor.3 1 As with statutory provi-
sions, the mandatory or permissive nature of the constitutional provision
is important. Constitutional provisions are generally accorded greater
weight than statutes since constitutions are considered the fundamental
" See generally Board of Trustees, Univ. of Ark. v. Pulaski County, 229 Ark.
370, 315 S.W.2d 879 (1958); Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.3d 199, 200, 695
P.2d 695, 700-01, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398,404 (1985); Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders
of Essex County, 30 N.J. 381, 153 A.2d 10 (1959); Miller v. Smith, 100 Wis.2d 609,
302 N.W. 2d 468 (1981); Board of County Comm'rs of Fremont v. State, 369 P.2d
537 (Wyo. 1962); Ex. rel. Ryan v. Retirement Bd. of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit
Fund of Chicago, 136 Ill. App. 3d 818, 483 N.E.2d 1037 (1985); Harless v. Carter,
42 Cal. 2d 352, 267 P.2d 4 (1954); Iowa Nat'l Indus. Loan Co. v. Iowa State Dep't
of Revenue, 224 N.W. 2d 437 (Iowa 1974); De Beaussaert v. Shelbvy Township,
122 Mich. App. 128, 333 N.W.2d 22 (1982); McNichols v. City of Denver, 101 Colo.
316, 74 P.2d 99 (1937).
28 Damon v. Secretary of HEW, 557 F.2d 31, 33 (2nd Cir. 1977) (public welfare
laws are construed liberally to effect their remedial purpose); State v. Herbert, 49
Ohio St.2d 88, 358 N.E.2d 1090 (1976); Town of Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police,
118 R.I. 160, 372 A.2d 1273 (1977); Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nicolazzi, 138 Wis.
2d 192, 405 N.W.2d 732 (1987).
29 Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 Ill. App.3d 545, 370 N.E. 2d 1198 (1977); State ex
rel. Florence-Carlton School Dist. No. 15-6 v. Board of County Comm'rs of Ravalli
County, 180 Mont. 285, 590 P.2d 602 (1978); County of San Francisco v. Collins,
216 Cal. 187, 13 P.2d 912 (1932); Gordon v. District Unemployment Compensa-
tion Bd., 402 A.2d 1251 (D.C. App. 1979); Kindley v. Governor of Maryland, 289
Md. 620, 426 A.2d 908 (1981); Selectmen of Sterling v. Governor, 289 Mass. App.
597, 317 N.E. 2d 209 (1974); Burton v. New Jersey Dep't of Inst's & Agencies, 147
N.J. Super. 124, 370 A.2d 878 (1977); Hall v. Cook County, 359 Ill. 528, 195 N.E.
54 (1935); Shinrone Farms, Inc. v. Gosch, 319 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1982); Smith v.
City Commission, 281 Mich. 235, 274 N.W. 776 (1937); City of Rome v. New York
State Health Dep't, 65 A.D. 2d 220, 411 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1978).
30 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 18 at § 71.08.
1 See generally M.DowELL, supra note 12.
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law of the state. Public policy and social justice provide the basis for liberal
construction of constitutional provisions designed to provide relief to the
poor. In Graham v. Reserve Life Insurance Company,3" a North Carolina
constitutional provision requiring "beneficent provision for the poor" was
interpreted to require state provision of medical treatment, without cost,
to the indigent sick.
The New York legislature once attempted to exclude persons under
the age of 21 from receiving welfare benefits unless they were living with
a parent or relative. In Tucker v. Toia,"3 a New York appellate court ruled
that this age restriction was unconstitutional and declared that welfare
benefits were fundamental rights since the provision of welfare benefits
is specifically mandated by the New York Constitution.
In Butte Community Union v. Lewis,' the Montana Supreme Court
noted that "states may interpret their own constitutions to afford greater
protections than the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized
in its interpretations of the federal counterparts to state constitutions.
Federal rights are considered minimal and a State constitution may be
more demanding than the equivalent federal constitutional provision.""
Language variation or the legislative history may provide a basis for
finding a state constitutional right to be more expansive than its federal
analogue." In recent years, litigants and judges have begun to look at state
constitutions as sources of more expansive rights than those available
under the federal Bill of Rights.3 7
III. ENFORCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DuTIEs
When state or local government officials fail to provide medical
assistance as required, or promulgate unreasonable restrictions on eligibili-
ty or services, court actions may be brought to require the governmental
agency to take affirmative action in order to perform its specified duties.
32 274 N.C. 115, 161 S.E.2d 485 (1968).
.3 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977).
712 P.2d 1309 (Mont. 1986).
35 Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). Only New York has a constitutional provision
as broad as Montana's. Compare MoNT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3) with NEW YORK
CONST. art. VII, § 8, art. XVII, §§ 1, 3, 4.
36 See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152
(1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) (where the California Supreme Court an-
alyzed legislative history and differences in language between state and federal
constitutional provisions); see also Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d
899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Batchelder
v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983) (broadens freedom
of speech based on differences between state and federal constitutions); Right to
Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 294, 450 A.2d 925, 933 (1982) (court based decision
on "more expansive" state constitutional language).
37 See, e.g., Bamberger, Boosting Your Case with Your State Constitution, A.B.A.
J., Mar. 1, 1986, at 45; Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Developments in the Law - The Interpretation
of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1193 (1982); Hudnut, State
Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restrain 63 DEN. U.L.
REV. 85 (1985).
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In view of the hardship, pain and suffering caused to persons who are
wrongfully denied medical assistance, all impermissible eligibility restric-
tions, inadequate program funding or other violations should be challenged
through negotiations and/or litigation.
Local government regulations, policies or procedures may be struck
down for any of the following reasons:
* In violation of constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions;
* In excess of statutory authority;
* Made in accordance with an unlawful procedure;
* Clearly erroneous in view of reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the record;
* Arbitrary and capricious; or
* Affected by other areas of law.
When challenging local government policies or regulations developed pur-
suant to state or local government medical assistance program statutes,
advocates should begin by discussing and negotiating with program ad-
ministrators. Negotiations are a necessary prerequisite to any planned
litigation, since litigation takes time and costs money. Further the im-
plementation of judicially imposed remedies can be difficult. Despite the
limitations of litigation, carefully planned lawsuits produce positive results
and can be a uniquely effective tool in increasing access for the medically
indigent. Moreover, lawsuits raise the public consciousness and attract the
attention of taxpayers and governmental officials.
A. Failure to Fund or Establish a State or Local Government Medical
Assistance Program as Required
The lack of available funds does not exempt governmental entities from
their statutory obligations to provide medical care for indigents.3 8 Failure
to finance required medical assistance programs may be remedied by a
writ of mandamus, mandatory injunction, or request for declaratory relief.3 9
38 St. John's Hosp. v. Town of Capitol, 75 Ill. App. 2d 222, 220 N.E.2d 333 (1966);
Cahalan v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'r, 93 Mich. App. 114, 286 N.W.2d 62 (1979)(budgetary reductions must not result in an appropriation so small that statutori-
ly mandated functions cannot be fulfilled); Toia v. Schueler, 55 A.D.2d 621, 389
N.Y.S.2d 414 (1976); Wilkins v. Perales, 128 Misc.2d 265,487 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1985)
(state has mandatory duty to aid the needy and may not ignore this mandate); contra
Board of Directors v. County Indigent Hosp. Claims Bd., 77 N.M. 475, 423 P.2d
994 (1967); Board of Comm'rs v. Ming, 195 Okla. 234, 156 P.2d 820 (1945); Cache
Valley Gen. Hosp. v. Cache County, 92 Utah 279, 67 P.2d 639 (1937).
31 See 54 C.J.S. Mandamus § 151 (1988 Supp.); see, e.g., Rodgers v. Detrich,
58 Cal.App.3d 90, 128 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1976) (welfare agency's improper actions or
failure to act may be corrected by mandamus); Carroll v. Miller, 116 Ill. App.3d
311, 451 N.E.2d 1034 (1983) (mandamus order issued to compel state agency to
furnish welfare assistance to applicants who established eligibility); Creighton -
Omaha Regional Health Care Corp. v. Douglas County, 202 Neb. 686,277 N.W.2d
64 (1979) (appropriate legal remedies may be employed to correct a public office's
refusal to perform its mandatory duty in respect to care of the poor); Hodge v.
Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983) (provision of adult protective services was
[Vol. 3:1
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In Madera Community Hospital v. County of Madera,40 a California court
granted a writ of mandamus to a hospital seeking to compel funding of
the county medical assistance program, and required the promulgation of
regulations regarding the county's statutory obligation to aid and care for
the medically indigent. In another case, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled
that a county Board of Supervisors' refusal to fund the poor relief program
necessitated county liability for the cost of hospitalization of an indigent
patient who became ill during the period when no poor relief program was
in operation. 1 The Ohio court noted that the claim for relief could be an
action for restitution, and there was no need to resort to the extraordinary
remedy of mandamus.42
After an Idaho county announced that its indigent care fund had been
depleted and it would not pay indigent medical assistance claims until the
following year, an Idaho court ruled that indigents were entitled to seek
declaratory judgment to the effect that medical aid could not be withheld
because of a lack of funds. 43 In San Francisco v. Superior Court of San Fran-
cisco,44 an analogous general assistance case, the court ruled that the coun-
ty had a duty to relieve and support its indigents and the excuse that it
could not afford to do so was unavailing. Similarly, a New York court ruled
that a county may not evade its obligation to provide for the welfare needs
of indigent residents because of the county legislature's refusal to allocate
necessary funding. 5 Moreover, the expenditure of limited funds must be
allocated based on some system of priority; the allocation should be
mandatory when discretionary plan for comprehensive system of adult protective
services was developed, and the agency's interpretation of the statute was inap-
plicable since it was unduly restrictive and in conflict with legislative intent);
McGraw v. Hansbarger, 301 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1983Xmandamus order directed
state agency to provide detoxification and alcoholism programs at community men-
tal health center and compelled the state government to fund such services); see
generally Brown & Cousineau, Effectiveness of State Mandates to Maintain Local
Government Health Services for the Poor, 9 J. HEALTH, POL. POL'Y & L. 223 (1984).
40 155 Cal. App. 3d 136, 201 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1984); see also Sandergren v. Florida
ex rel. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp., 397 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1981) (since the Florida
legislature had declared that counties must provide mental health services, fun-
ding of local program was a clear legal duty which could be compelled by man-
damus); Creighton - Omaha Regional Health Care Corp. v. Douglas County, 202
Neb. 686, 277 N.W.2d 64 (1979) (appropriate legal remedies may be employed to
correct county's refusal to perform its mandatory duty to care for the poor and in-
digent); E.H. v. Matin, 284 S.E. 2d 232 (W.Va. 1981) (state hospital's failure to
provide adequate care and treatment to mental patients was corrected by an ac-
tion in mandamus).
41 St. Thomas Hosp. v. Schmidt, 62 Ohio St.2d 439, 406 N.E.2d 819 (1980).
42 Id.
43 Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984).
44 57 Cal. App. 3d 44, 128 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1976).45 Wiklins v. Perales, 128 Misc.2d 265, 487 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1985); see also Cahalan
v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, 93 Mich. App. 114, 286 N.W.2d 62 (1979); King
v. Director of Midland County Dep't of Social Servs., 73 Mich. App. 253, 251 N.W.2d
270 (1977).
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evenhanded and not arbitrary. 46
As an alternative to mandamus actions, when governments fail to carry
out established required medical assistance programs, persons who meet
statutory eligibility criteria may implead the responsible governmental
entity as a defendant in collection actions brought by hospitals or physi-
cians. A court may imply a government promise to pay absent an express
contract, especially when the governmental entity had a mandatory duty
to provide medical assistance to the poor.47 In New York City Health &
Hosp. Corp. v. Jones,48 a court ruled that the state Department of Social
Services was liable to indemnify an indigent for a hospital collection judg-
ment rendered against him for hospitalization. The court noted that a quasi-
contractual duty could be imposed on the government to hold the indigent
patient harmless.
49
Attorneys representing the poor should also consider filing collection
action cross-complaints against governmental entities for causing emo-
tional distress and negligent impairment of their clients' credit rating.
Hospital collection actions against persons eligible for state or county
medical assistance programs may also violate state debt collection prac-
tice statutes.
B. The Scope of Services Which Must Be Provided
Most state statutes do not define the types or amounts of medical ser-
vices to which eligible individuals are entitled.50 In general, the amount,
duration, and scope of state and local government medical assistance pro-
grams are left to agency discretion. Since no statutory requirement is in-
tended by the legislature to be superfluous, the statute should be construed
according to its subject matter and the purpose for which it was enacted.
Review of statutory enabling language, legislative history, and judicial
interpretations are the primary indicators of the statute's true purpose.
For example, the preamble to the Idaho medical assistance statute states
that its purpose is to "provide suitable facilities and provisions for the care
and hospitalization of persons in the state."'"
" See Cahalan v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, 93 Mich. App. 114,286 N.W.2d
62 (1979); Caldwell v. Department of Social Welfare, 134 Vt. 96, 353 A.2d 336 (1976);
Pannell v. Thompson, 91 Wash. 2d 591, 589 P.2d 1235 (1979).
"I Mt. Carmel Medical, Center v. Board of County Comm'rs, 1 Kan. App. 2d
374,566 P.2d 384 (1977); Creighton -Omaha Regional Health Care Corp. v. Douglas
County, 202 Neb. 686,277 N.W.2d 64 (1979); St. Thomas Hosp. v. Schmidt, 62 Ohio
St.2d 439, 406 N.E.2d 819 (1980).
41 117 Misc. 2d 61, 457 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1982).49 Id See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1988) which provides
that "[u]nless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of
a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in
the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and ...
the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the
benefit of the promised performance."
50 See generally M. DOWELL, supra note 12.
51 IDAHO CODE § 31-3501 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
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Review of legislative statutory intent may indicate a desire to ensure
that all persons obtain necessary medical care of all kinds. The word
"necessary" refers to that which is needed for accomplishing a given pur-
pose as determined by persons objectively qualified to make the judgment
of need.2 Medical necessity should be the only criteria for deciding whether
to fund certain services for medical assistance recipients. Benefits provided
under minimum coverage health insurance programs and health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) are examples of minimum services
which should be provided under state or local government medical
assistance programs. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973"3
lists the following services as required basic medical services:
* Hospital services (inpatient and outpatient);
* Physician services;
* Emergency medical care;
* Limited outpatient mental health services;
* Alcohol and drug abuse treatment;
* Laboratory, x-ray;
* Home health services;
* Immunizations, contagious disease control, and other preventive health
services.
While counties may have discretion in how they fulfill their duty to
provide indigent health care, this discretion is not absolute. It must be ex-
ercised within fixed boundaries and consistent with the underlying statutes
which impose the duty. A New York court ruled that the types of care,
services, and supplies available under the state medical assistance pro-
gram are not limited to those specifically referred to under that statute. 4
Thus, an elderly widow was entitled to medical assistance funding for a
special diet prescribed as treatment for hypoglycemia, and to reimburse-
ment for the difference between the cost of that diet and a normal diet
for the six years since she applied for that assistance. An Idaho court recent-
ly ruled that the provision of medical assistance required county reimburse-
ment for an indigent patient's private physician bills.55
A New Jersey poor relief statute, which provided that the county "shall
render such aid and material assistance as he may in his discretion,
52 See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980); Dodson v. Parham,
427 F.Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Jeneski v. Meyers, 163 Cal. App.3d 18, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 178 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1136 (1985); G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App.3d
64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978); J.D. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App.3d 90, 145 Cal. Rptr.
570 (1978); Brooks v. Smith, 356 A.2d 723 (Me. 1976); Doe v. Department of Pub.
Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977).
53 Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat.
914 (1973), as amended Pub. L. No. 100-517, 102 Stat. 2578 (1988).
11 Denton v. Perales, 129 A.D.2d 636,514 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1987), aff d, 72 N.Y.2d
979, 530 N.E.2d 1284, 534 N.Y.S. 2d 364 (1988).
" Saxton v. Gem County, 113 Idaho 929, 750 P.2d 950 (1988).
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•.. deem necessary to the end that such person may not unnecessarily suf-
fer from sickness," was held in Higdon v. Boning to require the town to
provide physical therapy to a disabled indigent patient.5 6 Since the statute
did not expressly define the sicknesses or diseases for which a needy per-
son could receive assistance, the county was precluded from excluding such
a common and inexpensive mode of medical treatment from coverage."
The Higdon court noted that the requirement to provide "necessary"
medical assistance reflected a legislative intent to provide for the allevia-
tion of human suffering and recognized certain basic human dignity, which
is the duty of society to foster and preserve.5 8 However, an Illinois court
held that the statutory provision that "counties may provide any necessary
treatment, care, and supplies required because of illness or injury" meant
that agency administrators had discretion to determine whether to include
payment for optical and nonemergency dental care. 9
Several courts have ruled that medical assistance programs must pro-
vide transportation or reimburse travel expenses where an applicant's need
to travel in order to obtain medical assistance is established." A Califor-
nia court held that "when an emergency occurs which requires hospitaliza-
tion, it necessarily follows that the duty to provide medical care includes
the duty to provide emergency transportation."'" A South Dakota court
ruled that a South Dakota county was liable for the costs of airplane am-
bulance transport services provided to an indigent resident.6 2
Despite non-specific language in the California general assistance
statute, a California appellate court relied on statutory language, which
56 Higdon v. Boning, 121 N.J. Super. 276, 296 A.2d 569 (1972).
" Id. at 279, 296 A.2d at 572.
56 Id.
51 Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Pub. Aid, 94 Ill. App.3d 11, 418 N.E.2d 178 (1981);
see generally Zuravsky v. Asta, 116 Ariz. 473, 569 P.2d 1371 (1977) (range of medical
services provided by a county is best left to its board of supervisors); Lutheran Hosp.
of Fort Wayne, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 397 N.E.2d 638 (Ind. App. 1979)
(normal pregnancy was not a "disease, defect, or deformity" within the meaning
of the Indiana statute which required the county to provide assistance for persons
suffering from a disease, defect, or deformity); cf Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Bryan,
399 N.W.2d 352 (S.D. 1987) (air ambulance service is a service the county owes
to the poor since it is a mini-hospital outfitted with special equipment and trained
medical personnel).
60 City of Lomita v. County of Los Angeles, 148 Cal. App. 3d 671, 196 Cal. Rptr.
221 (1983), later proceeding, City of Lomita v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 3d
479, 230 Cal.Rptr. 790 (1986) (county medical assistance duties include an obliga-
tion to reimburse city for emergency medical transportation); Clark v. Blum, 68
A.D.2d 1005, 415 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1979) (medical assistance program required to pro-
vide travel expenses where an applicant needs to travel in order to obtain medical
assistance).
61 City of Lomita, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 673, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 221; see also City
of Lomita v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 3d 479, 230 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1986) (writ
of mandamus issued to require counties to provide emergency medical transporta-
tion to low-income residents).
62 Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Bryan, 399 N.W. 2d 352 (S.D. 1987).
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required local welfare agencies to "relieve and support" and to provide
"appropriate aid and services to all its needy and distressed," and directed
the local welfare agency to provide general assistance and care, which pro-
vided all the benefits necessary for basic survival.63 The court ruled that
setting general assistance grant standards so far below what is necessary
to survive, for persons who have no other means to live, is arbitrary and
capricious and not consistent with the objects and purposes of the law re-
quiring such aid. Similarly, in State ex reL Ventrone v. Birkel," the Ohio
Supreme Court held that a $43/month general assistance grant was in-
adequate to satisfy the statutory mandate to establish general assistance
levels "sufficient to maintain [the] health and decency" of eligible in-
dividuals.6 5 The court ruled that the paltry general assistance grant was
an abrogation of the clear intent of the Ohio legislature to provide indigents
with minimum subsistence support.
Many medical assistance programs contain a limitation on the max-
imum days of hospitalization."6 Unless expressly stated in the statutory
mandate, such limitations are of dubious legality. In Welborn Memorial
Baptist Hospital v. County Dept of Public Welfare,6 7 an Indiana court pro-
hibited the county from limiting the maximum number of days for indigent
hospital care. The court ruled that the legislature had not granted the coun-
ty the discretion or authority to limit reimbursement of hospital expenses
incurred by indigents.6 8 All program limitations must be consistent with
the relevant medical assistance statute, and agency-based limitations on
the provision of poor relief may not be justified by the need to conserve
public funds.6 9 Limiting indigent medical care to public hospitals or
facilities accessible to all county residents may be also contrary to the in-
tent of medical assistance statutes. In Washoe County v. Wittenbert,70 the
Nevada Supreme Court held that the mere operation of a county hospital
Boehm v. Superior Court, County of Merced, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 716 (1986).
454 Ohio St.2d 461, 377 N.E.2d 780 (1978), later appealed, State ex rel. Ven-
trone v. Birkel, 65 Ohio St.2d 10, 417 N.E.2d 1249 (1981); but see Collins v. Hoke,
705 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1983) (state statute obligating counties to provide general
relief gives the county board of social services complete discretion as to form and
amount of support it would provide).
65 State ex reL Ventrone, 54 Ohio St.2d at 462, 377 N.E.2d at 781.
See generally M. DOWELL, supra note 12; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH
POLICY PROJECT, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, STATE PROGRAMS OF ASSISTANCE
FOR THE MEDICALLY INDIGENT (1985).
67 442 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
66 I&
69 See infra notes 97, 108; see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979); Rinaldi
v. Yaegar, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). Cf Warrior v. Thompson, 96 Ill.2d 1, 449 N.E.2d
53 (1983) (Governor permitted to implement Employment Emergency Budget Act
regulations which placed a maximum day limitation on general aid-medical
assistance and eliminated the Aid to the Medically Indigent Program).
70 100 Nev. 143, 676 P.2d 808 (1984).
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was not sufficient to fulfill the county obligation to provide medical care
for indigents. The Washoe court noted that if there is a duty to provide
care, and it cannot under the circumstances be reasonably provided at the
county hospital, it must be provided elsewhere at the county's expense. 1
This argument may be used to secure access to emergency care, services
unavailable at a county facility and satellite primary care sites, or transpor-
tation for people who live a great distance from a county facility.
Geographic limitations are improper, beyond the scope of government
discretion, and abrogate statutory intent to provide medical assistance to
all indigents.
State or local governments which meet their statutory obligations
through a network of public hospitals and clinics also have a duty to main-
tain public facilities in a manner so the indigent will receive high quality
medical care. In Ochoa v. Superior Court,"2 the California Supreme Court
ruled that governmental conduct manifesting a deliberate indifference to
the serious medical needs of a person for whom the government was respon-
sible is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights violation because it impinges on
an indigent's liberty interest protected by the due process clause and his/her
right to be free from cruel or unusual punishment. In Harris v. Harris
County Hosp. Dist., 7 plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of a county
hospital's facilities. The Texas appellate court ruled that in determining
whether the hospital had exercised reasonable care the jury should con-
sider "the physical custodial surroundings [provided] for mental patients. '74
A recent California suit challenges state and county medical assistance
funding cutbacks on the grounds that a wrongful death occurred because
71 Id. at 145-46, 676 P.2d at 810-11. See generally Trinity Memorial Hosp. of
Cudahy, Inc. v. Milwaukee County, 113 Wis.2d 18,334 N.W.2d 685 (1983) (attempt
to establish one facility as primary care site ruled an impermissible precondition
for eligibility due to inconsistency with the statutory provisions for eligibility); see
also University of Utah Hosp. v. Bethne, 101 Idaho 245, 612 P.2d 1030 (1980) (defini-
tion of hospital in Idaho medical indigent statute does not limit payment of
necessary medical care and treatment to only those hospitals located in Utah); see
also McGraw v. Hansburger, 301 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1983) (W. Va. Supreme Court
required a local health director to provide inpatient detoxification services and other
alcoholism treatment programs at all community health centers rather than just
a couple of centralized locations); but see Warrior v. Thompson, 96 Ill.2d 1, 449
N.E.2d 53 (1983) (Governor, acting under 1982 Employment Emergency Budget
Act, was permitted to place a maximum day limitation on general assistance and
to eliminate entirely the aid to the Medically Indigent Program).
72 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1979); see also Deer v. County
of Alameda, No. 554052-9 (California Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1986). A $200,000 settle-
ment was reached in favor of a plaintiff who sued Alameda County and County
administrators for causing the stillbirth of her child by providing her with grossly
inadequate maternity care at the County hospital. Amy Deer brought an action
for damages on four theories: negligence, deprivation of federal civil rights under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, various state statutes, and breach of trust by County
administrators.
73 557 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
74 Id. at 355.
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the public hospital had been allowed to operate with inadequate equip-
ment, poor maintenance, and insufficient personnel to provide the quality
of services available at private hospitals in the community.75 The suit also
alleges civil rights discrimination, since the brunt of state and county
medical assistance cutbacks fell disproportionately on the black and
Hispanic poor.
C. Removing Impermissible Eligibility Restrictions
Many state or county medical assistance programs utilize arbitrary
categorical eligibility criteria such as unemployability, age, residency,
citizenship, or require a person to be destitute rather than poor in order
to receive medical assistance. When a state or local government distributes
benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes are subject to review under
state constitutions and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution."6
Historically, social and economic welfare legislation have survived
equal protection scrutiny by merely bearing a rational relationship to the
statutory goal.77 However, in recent years there has developed a heightened
level of rational basis equal protection scrutiny and occasional application
of intermediate scrutiny to strike down barriers to eligibility or termina-
tion of social welfare benefits that threaten an interest in survival." Under
75 Jones v. Contra Costa County, No. 271331 (California Super. Ct. filed Nov.
12, 1985).
76 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that "no state shall ... deny to any
person equal protection of the laws." Equal protection challenges to governmen-
tal action may occur when individuals are either classified or treated differently
from those similarly situated.
11 Under the rational basis test a law will be upheld unless the party challeng-
ing it proves that it has no rational relationship to any conceivable legitimate
legislative purpose. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569 (1980); Dandridge
v. Williams, 392 U.S. 471 (1970) (the Court rejected an equal protection challenge
to a Maryland welfare statute that set a maximum limit on care assistance to
families above a certain size, regardless of the number of additional children because
the statute was rationally based); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166 (1980) (state may eliminate benefits to certain classes of persons on any
basis not "patently arbitrary" or irrational); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971) (upheld reduced social security benefits, which offset worker's compensa-
tion benefits on a rational basis test); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 635 (1977)
(Court rejected a challenge to a Texas law, which provided lower grants to AFDC
recipients than to elderly who received social security benefits); see, e.g., Exxon
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
11 Ranchburg v. Toan, 709 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1983) (a Missouri welfare statute,
which limited the class of disabled persons who could receive home heating bill
assistance benefits to those receiving one of the types of public assistance benefits
in the statute but denied benefits to those receiving benefits under the medical
program, lacked a rational basis, and therefore, violated equal protection); Butte
Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309 (Mont. 1986) (legislative classification
denying welfare benefits to "able-bodied" under 50 who did not have dependent
children was invalidated after being subjected to heightened scrutiny equal pro-
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intermediate review, classifications must be "substantially related" to the
achievement of "important governmental objectives."7 This intermediate
level of scrutiny permits the court to carefully review the objective and
means of the challenged statute, instead of merely pronouncing it valid
or invalid under traditional rational basis review. The court does not ac-
cept every goal or objective offered by the state, and if an alternative means
exists which does not disadvantage the "group" or "classification," the
court can require the legislature to utilize least restrictive alternative
means by invalidating the legislation. Recent cases have based the need
for heightened judicial scrutiny on the fact that the challenged classifica-
tions punished individuals for circumstances beyond their control and
created "sensitive" groups or "discrete minorities."
The indigent sick have the characteristics of a sensitive class or minori-
ty: their poverty and illness is involuntary and a result of many. cir-
cumstances beyond their control. Moreover, the lack of adequate health
care creates a disadvantaged class. Thus classifications that exclude some
of the indigent sick should be accorded a heightened standard of equal pro-
tection review; either intermediate scrutiny or a heightened rational basis
review.
With heightened rational basis review, a government is required to
produce convincing evidence that demonstrates a rational relationship be-
tween the statutory or regulatory classification and preeminent statutory
goal. In determining the level of necessary scrutiny to apply courts will
consider:
tection analysis); Morales v. Minter, 393 F.Supp. 88 (D.Mass. 1975) (the court held
that the exclusion of the elderly from eligibility for welfare assistance denied them
equal protection because it bore no relationship to the program's purpose of aiding
all Massachusetts residents in need of assistance); Medora v. Colautti, 602 F.2d
1149, 1152 (3rd Cir. 1979) (the court invalidated a welfare regulatory eligibility
requirement which utilized grounds other than need "when disparate treatment
is purposeful and results in denial of all aid to some, but not all similarly situated
persons, the courts more closely examine the rationality of the classification." The
court ruled that administrative classifications must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground having a "fair and substantial relationship" to
the object of the legislation); Felder v. Foster, 71 A.D.2d 71, 421 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1979)
(Saving money was not proper justification for terminating welfare assistance to
single persons); Rich, Equal Protection for the Poor: Fair Distribution to Meet Brutal
Needs, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1117 (1987); Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite, 62
IND. L.J. 779 (1987); see generally Good, Freedom From Want: The Failure of the
United States Courts to Protect Subsistance Rights, 6 HuM. RTs. Q. 335 (1984), In-
termediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare Laws that Deny Subsistence, 132
U.PA.L. REV. 1547 (1984); Judinsky, Selecting the Appropriate Standard of Review
for Equal Protection Challenges to Legislation Concerning Subsistence Benefits, 53
Cn. L. REV. 587 (1984); Abramson, Equal Protection and Administrative Conve-
nience, 52 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1984). Cf Barone v. Department of Human Servs., 210
N.J. Super. 276, 509 A.2d 786 (1986); Price v. Cohen, 565 F.Supp. 657 (E.D.Pa.),
rev'd, 715 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 102 (1984).
79Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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(1) the character of classification in question;
(2) the relative importance to government benefits not received to the
individuals in the class discriminated against; and
(3) the strength of the interest asserted by the state in support of the
classification.
The requisite level of scrutiny will vary with
the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification is drawn. A classifica-
tion that denies all benefits to some similarly situated persons
must be subjected to closer scrutiny than one that allocates some
benefits to all similarly situated persons.8
"Maintaining the personal dignity and stability of persons on the edge
of poverty serves not only their personal interests, but the interests of the
society in which they live."81 Denial of medical assistance interferes with
the right to free speech, assembly and petition since the indigent sick will
be unable to communicate or associate with the public. Medical assistance
denials also violate the right to travel and the right to privacy through
denial of access to birth control. The medically indigent are among those
classes with the least political power; access to health care is a-prerequisite
to political participation and the medically indigent are "minorities" in
need of protection from self-serving governmental political decisions. When
persons sustain injuries or illnesses so grave that hospitalization is required
to preserve life or restore physical well-being, access to health care is a
fundamental right to life, and the state or local government's interest in
creating eligibility classifications must be compelling to overcome their
needs. Barriers to adequate health care prevent indigent persons from
becoming productive members of society and lower the indigents status
in the community, thus creating a disadvantaged class. As the Supreme
Court noted in Goldberg v. Kelley"2 the termination of welfare benefits
forces an indigent into a desperate struggle for survival and renders that
person practically incapable of protecting his or her rights. Moreover,
"legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by vir-
tue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of 'class or
caste' treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
abolish."8 3
80 Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 639 n.3 (1986); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Medora v. Colautti, 602 F.2d 1149, 1154 n.1 (3rd
Cir. 1979).
81 Soave v. Milliken, 497 F.Supp. 254, 262 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
82 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250, 259 (1974) ("governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sub-
sistence have often been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance than
less essential forms of government entitlements").
83 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.14 (1982); see also, Price v. Cohen, 715
F.2d 87, 90 (3rd Cir. 1983) (discussing plight of plaintiffs who would probably be
forced to seek survival on the street).
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In Plyler, the Supreme Court indicated that intermediate scrutiny
should be applied when the denial of an "important" interest with a close
nexus to constitutional rights would result in discriminatory infringement
of the constitutional rights of a disadvantaged group.84 In Plyler the Court
was faced with a Texas law that denied free public education to the children
of illegal aliens.8 5 The Court declined to find the disadvantaged class of
illegal aliens suspect, or the right of education fundamental, but found
that the challenged classification "can hardly be considered rational unless
it furthers some substantial goal of the state. 8 6 The Court based the use
of intermediate scrutiny on the nature of the classification and the impor-
tance of the right affected by the classification. The classification of illegal
alien children warranted intermediate scrutiny since it burdened a
"discrete class of children, not accountable for their disabling status."8
Texas advanced three reasons to justify the statute: (1) the preserva-
tion of the state's limited resources, (2) the burden imposed on the state
to provide quality education for the undocumented children, and (3) the
fact that undocumented children were less likely to remain in the state
to put their education to productive social or political use. The statute was
invalidated because the state could not demonstrate that any of these in-
terests was substantial.8 The Plyler decision holds that where the com-
plete denial of an important interest is threatened, the court will inquire
whether the classification "[r]eflects a reasoned judgment consistent with
the idea of equal protection ...."89
In a more recent U.S. Supreme Court decision a unanimous panel over-
turned a zoning ordinance that required a special use permit for a group
home for the mentally retarded. 90 The Court purported to employ rational
basis minimal scrutiny, but in fact subjected the ordinance to a height-
ened form of scrutiny. The Court ruled that the trial court record did not
justify requiring a special permit for the group home.9 1 Traditional rational
4 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
85 The Plyler Court indicated that the application of intermediate scrutiny hinges
on the vulnerability of a "disfavored underclass" and on the importance of the rights
affected. Id. at 221 n.20. The Court asserted that illegal aliens were a disfavored
underclass and virtually defenseless against exploitation. Id. at 219, 222; see, e.g.,
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigency treated as a sensitive class).
86 457 U.S. at 224.
"' The Court noted the importance of education in the democratic process and
in promoting upward social mobility. The Court then noted that a denial of basic
education would deny children "the ability to live... and would perpetuate a
subclass of illiterates." Id. at 230.
88 Id. at 227-30.
89 Id. at 230.
9o City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
91 Id. at 448.
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basis scrutiny would have required no such examination of the record to
determine whether the policies were actually supported by fact. Three
justices concurred separately, insisting that the provisions at issue should
have been declared invalid under the intermediate scrutiny standard. They
contended that heightened scrutiny was necessary due to the importance
of the interest at stake.2
In Butte Community Union v. Lewis,93 the Montana Supreme Court
struck down a statute that excluded all able-bodied persons under the age
of thirty-five having no dependent minor children living with them, from
general assistance eligibility and provided very limited general assistance
to able-bodied persons between the ages of thirty-five and forty-nine. Utiliz-
ing intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the challenged statute
established an impermissible discriminatory classification which denied
equal protection. In determining whether the statute violated the equal
protection clause of the Montana Constitution, the court required the state
to show that the classification of welfare benefits on the basis of age was
reasonable, and that its interest in classifying welfare recipients on the
basis of age was more important than the people's interest in obtaining
welfare benefits. 4 The state failed to show that able-bodied persons under
the age of fifty were more capable of surviving than those over fifty; nor
did it demonstrate that the interests of the state outweighed those of the
individuals affected.
In response, the Montana legislature passed the following legislation:
"The legislature, in recognition of the need to expand the employment op-
portunities available to able-bodied persons who do not have dependent
minor children, will provide two months of general relief so that such able-
bodied persons may be eligible for the job readiness training." 95 Though
deleting the reference to age, the new legislation classified the poor into
two groups: (1) able-bodied persons with minor dependent children and the
infirm are eligible for general assistance 12 months per year; and (2) able-
bodied persons with no minor children are eligible only two months per
year.
This legislation was also challenged on equal protection grounds. The
Montana Supreme Court ruled that the classification "able-bodied with
no minor dependent children" is unconstitutional since it bears no logical
relation to need for assistance since the legislation falsely assumes that
the excluded class is an employable one,96 and does not consider numerous
barriers to employment. The classification "without dependent minor
children" also is unreasonable because it falsely assumes that such per-
sons could never be determined indigent.
92 Id. at 458-60 (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part, dissen-
ting in part).
13 712 P.2d 1309 (Mont. 1986).
14 Id. at 1314.
" In June, 1986, the legislature passed HB 33.
96 Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 745 P.2d 1128 (Mont. 1987).
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In Ranschburg v. Toan,97 a free heat program sponsored by the state
of Missouri for poor, elderly, and disabled persons excluded participants
in the state medical assistance program who already had been determined
to be disabled under standards equally as restrictive as those in the free
heat program. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that to exclude
persons similarly situated to those receiving the free heat assistance lacked
a rational basis and, therefore, violated equal protection. 8
Though unwilling to create new quasi-suspect classifications, or to find
fundamental rights infringed upon, courts increasingly have been prone
to strike down legislation as serving no legitimate purpose and to demand
justification stronger than a proffered governmental interest. Past courts
had found almost any governmental purpose legitimate, without regard
to whether it actually motivated the challenged legislation, or was even
advanced in defense of the classification. Now, use of the rational basis
testing equal protection analysis no longer means that the challenged
statute or policy will be automatically found valid. On the contrary, courts
have explicitly used the rational basis test to find state statutes or policies
in violation of the equal protection clause. In four cases during the 1984
term, the Supreme Court struck down state or municipal statutes for equal
protection violations.9 9 These recent Supreme Court decisions hold that
a classification that is arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest offends equal protection of the law. Thus
to uphold challenged legislation, the Court must find that the statutory
classifications are rationally related to legitimate state interests or objec-
tives, and the Court must determine what governmental interests are
served, whether those interests are legitimate, and whether they are ra-
tionally related to the statutory classifications created to serve them. State
objectives, when served by discriminatory means, are not "legitimate" and
therefore violate equal protection. 00
Medical assistance program rules and regulations must be consistent
with the statutory mandate, and be reasonably necessary to effectuate its
purpose.'0 ' An administrative agency cannot alter the plain language of
a statute or adopt regulations contrary to the language of the statute pur-
suant to which they are adopted.0 2
97 709 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1983).
98 Id. at 1210.
9 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S.
14 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Word, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). See also Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Wohlgemuth v. Williams, 415 U.S. 901 (1974); U.S.
Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
'o See generally Moreno, 413 U.S. 528.
101 San Francisco v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App.3d 44, 50, 128 Cal. Rptr. 712,
716 (1976) ("We have no doubt that when statutes affecting the well-being, perhaps
the very survival of citizens of this state, are being violated with impunity by the
county, an agent of the state, the courts, as final interpreters of the law, must in-
tervene to enforce compliance.")
102 Biomedical Labs, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill.2d 540, 370 N.E.2d 273 (1977).
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1. Employability
Some medical assistance program administrators require a person to
be unemployable or disabled in order to obtain medical assistance, although
relevant statutory provisions do not exclude employable individuals from
eligibility. Obviously, people can be "poor" or "needy" despite their po-
tential employability. When a statute equates eligibility for indigent
medical assistance with financial need, further restrictive provisions, such
as employability, narrow eligibility beyond the legislative purpose and are
thus unconstitutional." 3 Employable persons may not be denied eligibili-
ty by agency policy or regulations, "upon the theory that their employabili-
ty is an economic resource which the county may weigh against their in-
digence because it is no more than a theoretical resource. "104
In Page v. Auburn,"0 5 a Maine court ruled that a city's general
assistance program could not be conditioned on unemployability because
the statutory authorization to provide general assistance was conditioned
on need alone. A Montana statute that eliminated general assistance to
able-bodied persons under the age of 35 who did not have minor depen-
dent children and reduced benefits for ages 35-49 without dependent
children was also recently found unconstitutional. 1 6 The Montana Supreme
Court ruled that the state constitution, the statute's legislative history,
and state case law require Montana counties to provide general assistance
benefits sufficient to meet the needs of all of the indigent sick.0 7 "Although
states may have great discretion in the area of social welfare, they do not
have unbridled discretion. They must still explain why they chose to favor
one group of recipients over another."10 8
103 See supra notes 99-102 and infra notes 104-110.
104 Bernhardt v. Alameda County Bd. of Supervisors, 58 Cal. App. 3d 806, 811,
130 Cal. Rptr. 189, 192 (1976); see also Covington v. Missouri State Div. of Family
Sery's, 603 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. App. 1980); Nelson v. Board of Supervisors, 190
Cal.App. 3d 25 (1987) (county general assistance program unlawfully excluded in-
digents without fixed addresses); Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal.3d 669, 679-81, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 279, 281-83 (1971) (court struck down county regulation denying non-
emergency general assistance to employable single men). But see, Smith v. Peet,
29 Or. App. 625, 564 P.2d 1083 (1977) (state had discretion to exclude employable
persons from welfare assistance).
105 440 A.2d 363 (Me. 1982); see generally Pascucci v. Vaggot, 71 N.J. 40, 362
A.2d 566 (1976); Jennings v. St. Louis, 323 Mo. 173, 58 S.W.2d 979 (1933); City
of Los Angeles v. Post War Public Work Review Bd., 26 Cal.2d 101, 156 P.2d 746
(1945); contra, Herrera v. Jamieson, 124 Ariz. 133, 602 P.2d 514 (1979); Cozart v.
Winfield, 687 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Peet, 29 Or. App. 625, 564 P.2d
1083 (1977).
106 Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309 (Mont. 1986).
107 Id. at 1313-14.
108 Ranschburg v. Toan, 709 F.2d 1207, 1222 (8th Cir. 1983) (invalidating
Missouri statute which limited the class of disabled persons who could receive
benefits to those receiving the types of public assistance benefits enumerated in
the statute but which denied such benefits to those receiving benefits under the
medical assistance program).
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Even if a statute limits the provision of poor relief to unemployable
persons, "employability" should be defined as the true potential to obtain
employment, rather than mere physical ability to work. °9 In Covington
v. Missouri State Division of Family Services,"' a Missouri appellate court
ruled that the denial of welfare benefits to a 49-year-old male with a third
grade education who had been previously employed only in a variety of
manual labor positions was an improper determination of employability.
Covington noted that an employability determination should consider plain-
tiff's illness and the extent to which employment was available for a per-
son with plaintiff's education, training, and experience.'' The following
factors are significant barriers to employment which should also be con-
sidered in determining employability:
* age * lack of transportation
* work history * no address or phone
* English-speaking ability * chronic health problems
* literacy * poor appearance or hygiene
* job availability * alcoholism or chemical dependency" 2
Classifications based on employability create invidious distinctions be-
tween two similarly situated types of people. To pass constitutional muster,
state or local governments must demonstrate that their classification is
tailored to serve a compelling government interest." 3 In Shapiro v. Thomp-
son,14 the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
We recognize that a state has a valid interest in preserving the
fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to
limit its expenditures, whether for public assistance, public
education, or any other program. But a state may not accomplish
such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its
citizens. [emphasis added]" 5
Such classifications also create an irrebuttable presumption that
employable persons can satisfy their medical assistance needs even when
unemployed or underemployed. This presumption is violative of the due
process clause of the U.S. Constitution."6
"o9 Pascucci v. Vaggot, 71 N.J. 40, 362 A.2d 566 (1976); see also A. WIcKs &
C. CARO, FACTORS AFFECTING THE EMPLOYABILITY OF WELFARE RECIPIENTS (1986).110 603 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
... Id. at 105.I" See generally Neiman, General Assistance: A Preliminary Legal Analysis,
13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 175 (1979); Hodge v. Ginsburg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W.Va. 1983)
(person who lacks means to maintain permanent residence was "incapacitated
adult" under statute authorizing the county to provide adult protective service to
incapacitated adults).
13 See supra notes 75-95.
14 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Id. at 633.
16 Id. at 632-33. See also Vlandis v. Klein, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Il-
linois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Soave v. Milliken, 497 F.Supp. 254 (W.D. Mich. 1980);
U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). Cf Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749 (1975) (irrebutable presumption repudiated in area of welfare eligibility
requirements).
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2. Age
Age restrictions for state medical assistance programs were prohibited
in Morales v. Minter." 7 In Morales, a Massachusetts statute which barred
persons below 18 years of age from receiving general medical relief was
struck down as a violation of the equal protection and due process rights
of emancipated indigents under 18 who met financial eligibility re-
quirements. " 8 When eligibility criteria for medical assistance programs
excludes classes of individuals, members of the class may show that the
classification is wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the statutory and
legislative objective. In Fecht v. Washington Dep't of Social & Health
Serv's,"9 a public assistance maximum age limit established by regula-
tion was declared unauthorized by state statute and was therefore void.
3. Residency
The liability of a state or local government for medical assistance pro-
vided for an indigent is usually determined by the place or residence of
the person aided or supported. To constitute residency the applicant must
live in the state and/or county with the intent to make it his home. Re-
quirements that an applicant for medical assistance live in a state or county
for a certain durational period of time as an eligibility condition impose
an unconstitutional limitation on the right of interstate travel.120 Since
residency does not determine need, in the absence of statutory provisions
expressly excluding nonresidents, all needy persons should be provided
medical assistance. State or local government medical assistance programs
have traditionally utilized durational residency requirements of variable
degrees. For example, the Idaho medical assistance statute requires ap-
plicants to have been a resident of the State of Idaho for at least one year
and of the county for at least six months preceding the application for
assistance. 121
Laws that prohibit newly arrived persons in a state or county from
receiving the same benefits as established residents are subject to strict
"1 393 F.Supp. 88 (D. Mass. 1975); but see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age classifications are not suspect classes requir-
ing strict scrutiny).
118 Morales, 393 F.Supp. at 96.
119 86 Wash.2d 109, 542 P.2d 780 (1975); but see Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87
(3rd Cir. 1983).
120 Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250 (1974) (state law requiring one year residency in the county for per-
sons seeking free non-emergency medical care was struck down). Cf Sioux Valley
Hospital Ass'n v. Kingsbury County, 414 N.W.2d 816 (S.D. 1987) (intent to remain
in state not sufficient evidence to meet poor relief residency requirement).
121 IDAHO CODE § 31-3504 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
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judicial scrutiny. '2 2 Durational residence requirements are subject to strict
scrutiny because they may penalize exercise of the constitutional right to
travel, which is a fundamental personal right.' 3 In Shapiro, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down, on fourteenth amendment equal protection
grounds, a one year state residency requirement for state welfare
benefits.'24 The Court held that there was no compelling state interest to
justify imposing a classification of indigent persons which impinged upon
their constitutional right to travel freely from state to state.'25 The Court
also ruled that durational residency requirements are unconstitutional
because they create irrebuttable presumptions that everyone who moves
interstate does so for the sole purpose of obtaining higher welfare
benefits.'2 6 In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,'27 the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down an Arizona county medical assistance program's dura-
tional residency requirement. The Memorial Hospital Court noted that bona
fide residency could be verified by means which did not impinge on the
right to travel.'2 8 Residency should be determined by mere physical
presence in the county with an intent to remain there for an indefinite
period of time, and could be demonstrated through a rental agreement,
proof of employment or unemployment registration.
4. Citizenship
State and local governments may not deny medical assistance benefits
to lawfully resident aliens. In Graham v. Richardson, 9 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that state restrictions on welfare benefits for lawfully resident
aliens, as a class, are inherently suspect and thus subject to strict scrutiny
analysis under the equal protection clause. In Graham, the Supreme Court
also ruled that such restrictions violated the supremacy clause because
they interfered with Congress' power to establish the conditions for alien
residence in the United States.'"0
Undocumented immigrants, unlike lawfully resident aliens, are not
a "suspect class" entitled to strict scrutiny judicial review. Thus, the power
of state and local governments to deny medical assistance benefits to
122 Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see also Hodge v. Ginsburg, 303 S.E.2d 245-
(W.Va. 1983); but see Bies v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 44 Pa. Commw. 274, 40 A.2d
1341 (1979).
123 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 638.
126 Id. at 631.
127 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
128 Id. at 266.
129 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (Arizona attempted to require durational residency of
15 years for federally-funded disability benefits; Pennsylvania attempted to limit
state-funded welfare benefits to U.S. citizens).
130 Id. at 378.
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undocumented immigrants may vary according to the state statute,
legislative history and constitutional provisions.3 1
In Plyler v. Doe,1 32 however, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Texas
statutes denying free public education to undocumented immigrants.
Although undocumented persons are not a suspect class, and education
is not a fundamental right, the Court overturned the Texas restrictions
using an intermediate level of review under the equal protection clause. '
In Perez v. New Mexico Dep't of Health and Social Serv's,34 an appellate
court ruled that an undocumented immigrant was a "person" within the
meaning of the state Special Medical Needs Act. The court noted that the
word "residence", as used in a statute, should be given its ordinary and
common meaning. The Arizona Supreme Court had previously ruled that
illegal entry into the United States does not disqualify an alien from becom-
ing a "resident" of a county of Arizona for the purpose of statutes govern-
ing medical assistance.1 35
Moreover, in Guerrero v. Cooper Queen Hosp. ,136 the Arizona Supreme
Court ruled that statutory emergency medical care requirements applied
to plaintiffs, notwithstanding the fact that they were not citizens of the
United States or residents of Arizona. The court pointed out that the statute
was directory in nature and did not contain an express legislative limita-
tion. California courts have ruled that undocumented aliens may be coun-
ty residents but counties are under no obligation to provide nonemergen-
cy care to the undocumented since the California indigent care statute re-
quires counties to provide relief to "lawful" indigent residents.1 3 Arguably,
a "lawful" resident is any undocumented immigrant who is not in viola-
tion of an order of deportation. The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that
U.S. citizen children of undocumented immigrant parents cannot be denied
medical assistance because of their parents' status.13 8
131 But see Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 99-603
§ 121, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmnm. NEws (100 Stat.) 3384 which limits state
or governmental ability to exclude undocumented persons from state or country
welfare programs.
132 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
133 Id at 211-16, 220-24.
13 91 N.M. 334, 573 P.2d 689 (1977), cert denied, 91 N.M. 491, 576 P.2d 297
(1978).
135 St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Center v. Maricopa County, 142 Ariz. 94, 688
P.2d 986 (1984).
138 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975).
137 Id See generally Bay General Community Hosp. v. County of San Diego,
156 Cal. App.3d 944, 203 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1984); Cabral v. State Bd. of Control, 112
Cal. App.3d 1012, 169 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1980); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 970 (1980).
13 Intermountain Health Care v. Board of Comm'rs of Blaire County, 109 Idaho
412, 707 P.2d 1051 (1985).
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5. Income Eligibility Standards
Unreasonable income eligibility standards are generally invalidated
because they are contrary to legislative intent. Many medical assistance
statutes fail to define indigency or give any indication of how to determine
who is entitled to free or reduced cost care. Despite the lack of statutory
guidance, program administrators must tailor eligibility standards to
match legislative intent.
The generally accepted definition of an indigent is "one who is needy
and poor, or one who has not sufficient property to furnish him a living
nor anyone able to support him to whom he is entitled to look for sup-
port.' 1 3 9 A medical indigent, however, "need not be impoverished or devoid
of all assets,"14 and may include a person who has insufficient means to
pay for necessary medical care after providing for those who legally claim
his support. 4 1 The term "poor" however, is generally synonymous with
139 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 695 (5th ed. 1979). See also Powers v. State, 194
Kan. 820,402 P.2d 328 (1965); Blouin v. City of Rockland, 441 A.2d 1008 (Me. 1982);
In re Fentress Estate, 249 Iowa 783, 89 N.W.2d 367 (1958); Town of St. Johnsbury
v. Town of Granby, 124 Vt. 367, 205 A.2d 422 (1964); Symmes Arlington Hosp.
v. Town of Arlington, 292 Mass. 162, 197 N.E. 677 (1935); Peabody v. Town of
Holland, 107 Vt. 237, 178 A. 888 (1935); Spokane County v. Arvin, 169 Wash. 349,
13 P.2d 1089 (1932); Town of Mazomanie v. Village of Mazomanie, 254 Wis. 597,
36 N.W.2d 696 (1949); Juneau County v. Wood County, 109 Wis. 330, 85 N.W. 387
(1901); Weeks v. Mansfield, 84 Conn. 544, 80 A. 784 (1911); Goodall v. Brite, 11
Cal. App. 2d 540, 54 P.2d 510 (1936); Healy v. Healy, 198 Misc. 688, 99 N.Y.S.
2d 874 (1950); Edeter v. Kember, 136 N.E.2d 630, 635 (Ohio 1955); Brown v. Up-
fold, 204 Misc. 416, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 342 (1953); Madison v. City and County of San
Francisco, 106 Cal.App. 2d 232, 234 P.2d 995 (1951); Destitute of Bennington County
v. Henry W. Putnam Memorial Hosp., 125 Vt. 289, 215 A.2d 134 (1965); County
Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Trustees of Indiana University, 145 Ind. App. 392, 251
N.E.2d 456 (1966).
14o Hudson County v. Hernandez, 157 N.J. Super. 85, 384 A.2d 552 (1978) (per-
son who has insufficient means to pay for maintenance in a private hospital after
providing for those who legally claim support qualifies as indigent); Parkview
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 134 Ind. App. 689, 191 N.E.2d
116 (1963) (court interpreted legislative intent to be that in order for a person to
be "poor" or "indigent" he or she need only be without sufficient resources to pay
for all the medical and hospital services required by the injury); Beaulieu v. City
of Lewiston, 440 A.2d 334 (Me. 1982) (welfare eligibility must be based on need,
and an applicant could not be denied assistance simply because she owned her own
home and sought welfare assistance to meet her mortgage payments); County of
Lander v. Board of Trustees of Elko General Hosp., 81 Nev. 354, 403 P.2d 659,
662 (1965); Commonwealth ex reL Home for the Jewish Aged v. Kotzker, 179 Pa.
Super. 521, 118 A.2d 271, 273 (1955); State v. Rutherford, 63 Wash. 2d 949, 389
P.2d 895, 898 (1964); State v. Henry, 733 S.W. 2d 127, 128 (Tenn. 1987); Neal v.
Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 506, 550 P.2d 539, 541 (1976); State v. Richter, 221 Neb.
487, 378 N.W. 2d 175, 179 (1985), later appealed, 225 Neb. 837, 408 N.W.2d 717
(1987).
141 St. Patrick Hosp. v. Powell County, 156 Mont. 153,477 P.2d 340 (1970); Sioux
Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Jones County, 309 N.W.2d 835 (S.D. 1981).
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the term "indigent."' 4 2 Thus, one need not be destitute to receive indigent
medical assistance.
The Federal Depertment of Health & Human Services poverty income
guideline is sometimes used by local governments to determine medical
assistance eligibility.'43 This method fails to consider assets or the needs
of medical indigents who reach indigency only because of enormous medical
bills. In the context of medical assistance, "poor" should always include
medical indigents whose costs of necessary medical care are so high that
remaining available income would be below the national poverty level. 44
In St. Patrick Hosp. v. Powell County, 45 a Montana court held that the
state's constitutional mandate to provide county indigent medical care re-
quired eligibility standards that considered not only family income, but
also debts, including outstanding medical bills.
Income eligibility criteria must be set at reasonable levels to respond
to the increased needs of the medically indigent. In addition, as inflation
rises and incomes increase, income eligibility criteria should be revised
annually to allow legislative intent to remain intact. The computational
method used to determine income eligibility must also be fair and
141 County Dep't of Public Welfare v. Trustees of Indiana University, 145 Ind.
App. 392,251 N.E.2d 456 (1966); Destitute of Bennington County v. Henry W. Put-
nam Memorial Hosp., 125 Vt. 289, 215 A.2d 134 (1965); Risner v. State ex rel. Mar-
tin, 55 Ohio App. 151, 9 N.E.2d 151 (1937); Dane County v. Barron County, 249
Wis. 618, 26 N.W.2d 249, 251, 254 (1947).
143 HHS poverty guidelines are annually updated and utilized as the current
United States official poverty threshold cutoff. For an excellent review of medical-
ly indigent eligiblity standards, see Nalibog & Lang, Expanding Access to Health
Care: Written Eligibility Standards for the Medically Indigent, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 848 (1980).
114 Wheatland County v. Bleeker, 175 Mont. 478, 575 P.2d 48 (1978) (intent
of medical assistance program is to extend broad coverage to those who, due to
calamitous circumstances, are faced with medical costs they cannot hope to meet);
Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. v. Dep't of Social and Rehabilitation Servs., 720
P.2d 1165 (Mont. 1986) (it would be unreasonable to deny medical assistance benefits
solely because an applicant's income exceeds the AFDC income eligibility
threshold). See also State v. Schutzler, 20 Ohio Misc. 79, 249 N.E.2d 549 (1969);
In re Estate of Feutress, 249 Iowa 783, 89 N.W.2d 367 (1958); In re Commitment
of Dennis, 135 Pa. Super. 237, 5 A.2d 406 (1939); In re Barnes, 119 Pa. Super. 533,
180 A. 718 (1935); Allegheny County v. City of Pittsburgh, 281 Pa. 300, 127 A.
72 (1924); Brock v. Jones County, 145 Iowa 397, 124 N.W. 209 (1910); Spokane
County v. Arvin, 169 Wash. 349, 13 P.2d 1089 (1932); Conant v. State, 197 Wash.
21, 84 P.2d 378 (1938). But cf Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Davison County, 319
N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1982Xbankruptcy insufficient to establish eligiblity for medical
assistance since such persons may have a present or future hope of resources and
the purpose of bankruptcy laws differ from the statutory purpose of relief to the
poor).
145 156 Mont. 153, 477 P.2d 340 (1970). See also Deaconess Medical Center, Inc.
v. Dep't of Social and Rehabilitative Servs., 720 A.2d 1165 (Mont. 1986) (legislature
may set income limitations that do not impede the purpose of the constitutional
provisions).
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reasonable. In McMullen v. Hargis, 146 an Arizona county's practice of tak-
ing gross income from the applicant's previous three months and multiply-
ing the figure by four to obtain annual income was ruled arbitrary,
capricious, and contrary to legislative intent. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court struck down a county regulation which made persons ineligible for
necessary nursing home care because their income exceeded federal
Medicaid guidelines. 4 7 The county argued that when the state adopted the
Medicaid program, the county's obligation was impliedly limited to those
who met the Medicaid income eligibility guidelines. The court rejected the
county's argument, stating, "in light of the deeply rooted and longstanding
obligation of local governments to provide assistance ... we must refuse
to infer such a limitation.' 1 48 The court further noted that county eligibility
requirements must reflect the "humanitarian purpose" of the statute and
bear a rational relationship to the costs of necessary medical care.149
Any eligibility criteria which is unrelated to need would deny the in-
digent their rights to equal protection and due process of law.15 0 Creation
146 128 Ariz. 142, 624 P.2d 339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); see generally County
Dep't of Public Welfare v. Baker, 434 N.E. 2d 958 (Ind. App. 1982) (financial
guidelines of the Department of Public Welfare which resulted in denial of medical
assistance to applicant who would have been eligible for assistance if there had
been a father in her family or one of other several family composition variations
contravened intent of medical assistance statute).
14' Hall v. County of Hillsborough, 122 N.H. 448, 445 A.2d 1125 (1982). See
also Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449,400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977) (invalida-
tion of welfare eligibility requirement for needy children not residing with a parent
to commence a support proceeding against a parent and receive a judgment before
becoming eligible for public assistance); County Dep't of Public Welfare v. Baker,
434 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. App. 1982). But see Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. v. Dep't
of Social and Rehabilitation Servs., 720 P.2d 1165 (Mont. 1986).
148 Hall, 445 A.2d at 1128.
19 Id. at 1127; cf Hubbard v. University of Arkansas Medical Sciences, 272
Ark. 500, 616 S.W.2d 10 (1981) (purpose of medical assistance statute was to
distribute proportionately the cost of indigent care among counties; thus, there
was no requirement that hospitals establish standards of indigency related to pa-
tient ability to pay).
150 A statute or regulation that arbitrarily creates a separate class of poor and
indigent persons who receive unequal treatment is a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause. See supra notes 77-79. Moreover unreasonable income eligibility restric-
tions are unlawful since they create an irrebutable presumption that certain
medically indigent persons are not entitled to "poor relief' or "medical assistance."
Such irrebutable presumptions violate due process requirements. Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441,449-53 (1973), overruled by, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653-58 (1972); Soave v. Millikin, 497 F.Supp. 254,
260-62 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Clay v. Tryk, 177 Cal. App. 3d 119, 124, 222 Cal. Rptr.
729, 732 (1986); Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs., 109 Idaho
881, 712 P.2d 582 (1985); see generally Sisters of Charity v. Glacier County, 177
Mont. 259, 581 P.2d 830 (1978) (fact that there are collateral resources available
should not be considered unless it is demonstrated that such collateral source is
currently available for medical expenses); Massachusetts General Hosp. v. Revere,
346 Mass. 217, 191 N.E.2d 120 (1963) (in establishing whether a person is "in need
of public assistance, a court must determine whether assets can be liquidated fast
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of arbitrary classifications of indigent persons impermissibly narrows broad
legislative poor relief statutes, is radically inconsistent with medical
assistance statutes, and fails to promote the statute's humanitarian pur-
pose. Income eligibility standards which have no relation to need or any
meaningful standard of poverty are unreasonable and in conflict with the
purpose of medical assistance legislation."'
D. Ensuring Due Process Protections
Many state or county medical assistance programs do not notify lower
income persons of the availability of medical assistance, lack written
eligibility criteria, or do not have proper notice and appeal procedures for
eligibility or service denials. Such program inadequacies are violative of
due process. These issues are so clear that a single demand letter may be
successful in changing program practice.
The Federal Constitution's fourteenth amendment prohibits depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Statutory en-
titlement to medical assistance benefits is a property right to which due
process rights attach. 152 Many courts have declared government-mandated
benefits to be property interests of both recipients and applicants."5 3
In 1972 the Supreme Court, in setting guidelines for when a person
has a property interest in a benefit, stated, "[t]o have a property interest
in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.' 154
Courts have focused upon two elements which establish such a claim
of entitlement: the language authorizing the benefit, and the eligibility
enough to cover medical expenses"); Luther Hosp. v. Eau Claire County, 115 Wis.2d
100, 339 N.W.2d 798 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (county's liability to pay for an indigent's
medical care is not affected by potential eligibility for veterans' relief); Braun v.
Ada County, 102 Idaho 901,643 P.2d 1071 (1982) (Hill-Burton uncompensated care
is not an available resource to be sought before eligibility for county and medical
assistance); St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Twin Falls County,
112 Idaho 309, 732 P.2d 278 (1987) (the indigent may receive county medical
assistance for treatment of self-inflicted injuries).
1-51 Hogan v. Harris, 501 F.Supp. 1129 (D. Mass. 1980), rev'd sub nom, Schweiker
v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569 (1982); see also supra notes 133-143.
152 See Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 470 U.S. 1018 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 124 (1985);
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Daniels
v. Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1984); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261,
1278 n.35 (7th Cir. 1981); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1979); White
v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976); Johnston v. Shaw, 556 F.Supp. 406 (D.Tex.
1982); Harris v. Lukhard, 547 F.Supp. 1015 (W.D Va. 1982), aff'd, 733 F.2d 1075
(4th Cir. 1984); Meyer v. Niles Township, 477 F.Supp. 357, 361-62 (N.D.Ill. 1979);
Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F.Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976); Alexander v. Silver-
man, 356 F.Supp. 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
"I See cases cited supra note 145.
154 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (emphasis added).
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requirements for receiving the benefit. If the court finds that the authoriz-
ing language is mandatory, as opposed to discretionary, and that the
eligibility requirements are comprehensive and specific enough to narrow
the government's discretion in granting the benefit, then the court will
hold that a property right exists.
In Matthews v. Eldridge,"" the Supreme Court noted that three distinct
factors must be considered and weighed before the specific dictates of due
process may be ascertained:
(1) The importance of the private interest that will be affected by the
official action;
(2) The risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest and the probable
value of additional procedural safeguards; and
(3) The importance to the government's interest and administrative
burdens that the additional procedural requirement would entail.'56
Issues of procedural due process frequently center on (1) whether a hear-
ing must be had prior to the deprivation or may take place after the govern-
ment action has already occurred, and (2) the nature of the hearing. In
Goldberg v. Kelly,"7 residents of New York City who were receiving finan-
cial aid under state and federally assisted welfare programs alleged that
state and city welfare officials had terminated, or were about to terminate,
that aid without prior notice and hearing in violation of due process. The
Supreme Court held that procedural due process required that welfare re-
cipients be afforded a hearing before termination of benefits by welfare
authorities."' Since welfare recipients had no other source of income, their
interest in continued receipt was of extreme importance, outweighing the
cost to the government of providing a prior evidentiary hearing. In
Matthews v. Eldridge,"' the Supreme Court considered whether a prior
evidentiary hearing was required by due process where the federal govern-
ment wished to terminate Social Security disability benefits. The Court
concluded that (a) such benefits were unlikely to be the sole source of in-
come to the recipient, so the interest of the individual of continuing to
receive such benefits during adjudication, though important, was not
critical, (b) the additional value of an evidentiary hearing would be minimal
since continuing eligibility to disability benefits is a medical issue usual-
ly determined by documentary evidence, and (c) the cost to the government
of providing full evidentiary hearings in each instance of termination of
disability benefits would be significant and might reduce the amount of
funds available to be paid out in such benefits.' Thus, no prior eviden-
tiary hearing was required. The Eldridge Court noted that after benefits are
1-5 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
156 Id. at 335.
157 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
"' Id. at 261-64.
1-9 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
160 Id. at 343-48.
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terminated, a former Social Security recipient is afforded an administrative
hearing, and may seek judicial review of that procedure. 6 1 For many such
former recipients, of course, the loss of income during the months and years
such procedures may occupy can be an ongoing problem. As the dissent
remarked in Eldridge, the recipient's home was lost through foreclosure
and his furniture was repossessed as a result of termination of his disability
benefits.'62 Potential beneficiaries of state or county medical assistance pro-
grams have a significant interest at stake. The indigent sick are persons
in need of relief by the state or counties in order to meet the minimum
requirements and exigencies of day-to-day living.
There are both substantive and procedural due process considerations
in the administration of state/local government medical assistance pro-
grams. Substantive due process analysis examines whether the ad-
ministrative procedures used to determine an applicant's eligibility might
deprive that person of an essential right. The lack of written uniform
eligibility standards and procedures will render statutes authorizing
medical assistance violative of substantive due process because the statute
is subject to arbitrary and capricious administration." 3 Procedural due pro-
cess involves looking at whether an applicant was afforded the fair-play
notions of proper notice and the right to a hearing. Procedural due pro-
cess requires that medical assistance recipients receive notice of the
availability of benefits, written applications and eligibility determinations
and an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to the denial or ter-
mination of benefits.
1. Notice of the Availability of Benefits
Notice to the public that benefits are available under state or local
government medical assistance programs is essential for due process. There
is a substantial risk of applicants being erroneously deprived of medical
assistance benefits if they are never informed of the availability of such
benefits nor informed of the standards of eligibility or service denials. Many
otherwise eligible indigent sick may be deterred from applying because
a lack of knowledge or because they are unable to ascertain whether or
not they qualify. The administrative burden and cost to the government
associated with providing notice of the availability of state or county
medical assistance and rights to appeal denials of eligibility or services
16 Id. at 349.
12 Id. at 350.
163 Leist v. Shawano County, 91 F.R.D. 64 (E.D. Wis. 1981); White v. Roughton,
530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F.Supp. 1134 (D.N.H.
1976); Madera Community Hosp. v. County of Madera, 155 Cal. App.3d 136, 201
Cal. Rptr. 768 (1984); State ex rel. Van Buskirk v. Wayne Township, 418 N.E.2d
234 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
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is not sufficient to override the interests of persons entitled to medical
assistance.
The requirement that governments publish written eligibility stan-
dards and inform the public of the availability of medical assistance for
the indigent sick is also an essential issue of due process. Due process man-
dates that a person be afforded a reasonable opportunity to know of the
rights and procedures to which he is entitled and the standards by which
he will be judged. Thus, governments must make good faith efforts
reasonably calculated to bring the availability of medical assistance to the
attention of potential beneficiaries and must publish objective, detailed,
and specific written standards of eligibility. 164
In Griffeth v. Detrich,16' applicants for general assistance benefits were
held to have a vested property interest in the county's relief program. The
statute authorizing the general relief program in Griffeth mandated
assistance for eligible applicants and directed the county board of super-
visors to establish standards for granting relief. The Griffeth court held
that the mandatory language of the statute, coupled with the specific
nature of the regulations, created an expectancy sufficient to rise to the
level of a property interest; thus, procedural due process requirements had
to be met before the county could deny the plaintiffs' claim.166 In Perez v.
Lavine,'67 the New York Department of Social Services failed to distribute
or to accept public assistance applications and also failed to supply infor-
mation about programs that were available. The district court found that
the plaintiffs' due process rights were violated and ordered the department
to provide applications and to post signs in every department office noti-
fying people that they had the right to apply for public assistance. In a
recent California case, Etter v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors,"8
the plaintiffs challenged the lack of notice of free county health care. Part
of the settlement agreement involved designing a detailed, readable notice
for patients. As stated by the United States District Court of the Northern
District of Indiana in its consideration of the procedural due process re-
quirements associated with the Indiana Medical Assistance Program:
"Notice that benefits under the Act are available is basic. Those eligible
under the Act are completely helpless to protect their rights if they are
not even aware that aid is available."' 69
14 Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th
Cir. 1979); Carey v. Queen, 588 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978); Perez v. Lavine, 422
F.Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F.Supp. 1134 (D.N.H.
1976); Gilmore v. Custer, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 370 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 29, 1980).
165 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1979).
166 Id. at 121.
167 422 F.Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
168 CA 90843 (Los Angeles Superior Court, consent agreement filed April 3,
1987).
169 Gilmore v. Custer, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 370 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 29, 1980).
[Vol. 3:1
MEDICAL CARE FOR THE POOR
2. Requirement for Written Eligibility Standards
Due process requires written standards and guidelines for eligibility
determinations and scope of available services. 7 ' Such standards and
guidelines must be public information.
In White v. Roughton,'7 ' the plaintiff challenged a locally-funded
general assistance program which did not have published standards for
eligibility, scope of services, or due process standards of notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing to appeal denials. In White, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that, in order to ensure fair and consistent application of eligibili-
ty requirements, program administrators were required to establish writ-
ten standards and regulations.172 The defendant administrator had ad-
mitted that his staff determined eligibility based upon their own arbitrary
personal standards. The White court declared such an arbitrary decision-
making procedure to be "clearly violative of due process."' 7 3
In a similar challenge to a standardless general assistance program,
the court in Baker-Chaput v. Cammett,174 held that establishing written,
objective, and ascertainable standards is an elementary and intrinsic part
of due process. Advocates should note that standards can be written objec-
tively and yet still be inadequate if they do not have sufficient detail to
reasonably apprise an applicant or a reviewer of the reasons for the
eligibility decision.
3. Right to Hearing, Fairness, and Appeal
Due process requires, in addition to an orderly application procedure,
notice and an opportunity to be heard for a person whose application is
denied. As the courts have recognized, an applicant for, or recipient of,
general assistance has an overwhelming interest in having a meaningful
opportunity to explain why assistance should not be denied.'75 Thus an
applicant whose request has been denied must be given an opportunity
for a timely hearing, although the hearing need not be held before benefits
are denied and need not be held at all when an application clearly indicates
170 White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976); Leist v. Shawano County,
91 F.R.D. 64 (E.D.Wis. 1981); Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F.Supp. 1223 (N.D.Ind. 1976)
(class certification granted); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F.Supp. 1134 (D.N.H.
1976); Madera Community Hosp. v. County of Madera, 155 Cal. App. 3d 136, 201
Cal. Rptr. 768 (1984); State ex rel. Van Buskirk v. Wayne Township, 418 N.E.2d
234 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Gilmore v. Custer, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 370 (N.D. Ind.
Feb. 29, 1980).
171 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976).
171 Id. at 753.
171 Id. at 754.
17 406 F.Supp. 1134, 1135 (D.N.H. 1976).
1 See generally Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254, 263-65. See also Brooks v. Center
Township, 485 F.2d 383, 385 (7th Cir. 1973); Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F.Supp.
1179, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
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on its face that the applicant is ineligible. 176 So that the applicant has a
meaningful opportunity to explain, the program administrator must pro-
vide a written statement of reasons if the applicant is denied assistance.17
Indigents must also be afforded the opportunity to complete a written
application of medical assistance. 7 ' Due process mandates a right to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, which can only
be accomplished by giving applicants an opportunity to submit information
in reference to his or her eligibility. 179 A prompt determination of eligibility
is necessary so that persons reluctant to furnish medical services without
assurance of payment be able to obtain that assurance in a time frame
consistent with medical necessity. 8 ' A District of Columbia federal court
ruled that due process requirements also prohibit subjecting medical
assistance program beneficiaries to long waits for appointments.'" Ap-
plicants should have the right to appeal an application denial and must
be informed of the method of review on appeal.8 2 Written statements of
the reasons for denying an application are necessary to give an applicant
a basis on which to contest the decision, i.e., by analyzing the reasons
behind it, correcting arithmetic errors, etc. s3
Due process always requires certain basic principles of fairness regard-
ing government actions. Program administrators must use written stand-
ards to ensure fair and consistent application of eligibility requirements.
Final determinations of eligibility or denials must be made by unbiased
tribunals.8 4 In Meyers v. Niles Township,' an Illinois court ruled that
a medically indigent patient was denied procedural due process in connec-
tion with denial of medical assistance where members of the public aid
eligibility committee were township supervisors who had an overriding
interest in protecting township funds and, thus, were unable to render an
unbiased, disinterested decision on medical assistance denial appeals.
176 Alexander, 356 F.Supp. at 1180.
177 Id.
171 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1986); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d
1261 (7th Cir. 1981); Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978); White v.
Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976); Perez v. Lavine, 422 F.Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Black v. Beame, 419 F.Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Baker-Chaput v. Cam-
mett, 406 F.Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976); Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F.Supp. 1179,
1181 (E.D.Wis. 1973).
179 Matthews, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
"I Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972);
Black v. Beame, 419 F.Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
"81 Spivey v. Barry, 501 F.Supp. 1093 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
665 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
is2 See M. DOWELL supra note 12, at 131-35.
Id. at 132.
14 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972).
185 477 F.Supp. 357 (N.D.Ill. 1979).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In light of recently erected barriers to health care for the poor, enforce-
ment of state and local government duties to provide medical assistance
is necessary to ensure adequate access to medical care. Government ef-
forts to reduce program budgets to contain indigent health care costs should
not be permitted to impair statutory and constitutional rights to medical
assistance.
Any improper governmental actions or failures to act may be chal-
lenged in the manners described herein. Though there is no federal con-
stitutional right to obtain medical assistance, public policy has always been
committed to the principle that equitable treatment of individuals, irrespec-
tive of economic characteristics, is fundamental to a democratic and
humane society.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
TO PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE FOR THE POOR
STATE PRIMARY INDIGENT CARE LAW
Alabama Alabama Health Care
Responsibility Act
ALA. CODE § 22-21-290-
22-21-297 (1984)
ALA. CONST. art. IV,




Alabama, 479 So. 2d
48 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)
Board of Comm'rs v. Board
of Trustees, 483 So. 2d
1365 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)
Alaska General Relief Medical NONE
ALAsKA STAT.
§§ 47.25.120 - 47.25.300 (1986)
ALAsKA CONST. art. VII,
§§ 4,5
Arizona Hospitalization and Medical Industrial Comm'n v.
Care of Indigent Sick Navajo County, 64 Ariz.
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. 172, 167 P.2d 113 (1946)
§§ 11-291 - 11-300
(Supp. 1988) (effective
Oct. 1, 1989)
Arizona Health Care St. Joseph's Hospital &
Cost Containment System Med. Center v. Maricopa
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. County, 142 Ariz. 94, 688
§§ 36-2901 - 36-2958 P.2d 986 (1984)
(Supp. 1988)
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STATE LEADING CASE LAW
Arkansas State Medical Center Hubbard v. University of
ARK. CODE ANN. Arkansas Medical Center,
§§ 6-64-501 - 6-64-504 272 Ark. 500, 616 S.W.2d
(1987 & Supp. 1988) 10 (1981)
ARK. CONST. art. 19,
§§ 16, 20
California County Health Services Madera County Hospital v.
CAL. WELF. & INST. County of Madera, 155
CODE App. 3d 136, 201 Cal.
§§ 16700-16718 Rptr. 768 (1984)
(West 1980 & Supp. 1989)
County Aid & Relief City & County of San
to Indigents Francisco v. Superior
CAL. WELF. & INST. Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 44,
CODE §§ 17000-17501 128 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1976)
(1980 & Supp. 1989)
CAL. CONsT. art. 16,
§§ 14, 15
Colorado Reform Act for the Provision McNichols v. City &
of Health Care for the County of Denver, 101
Medically Indigent Colo. 316, 74 P.2d 99
COLO. REV. STAT. (1937)
§§ 26-15-101 - 26-15-113
(Supp. 1988)
Connecticut Medical Assistance Aid Middlesex Memorial Hosp.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. v. Town of North Haven,
§§ 17 - 273, 274, 292 206 Conn. 1, 535 A.2d 1303
(West 1988) (1988)
Windham Community
Hosp. v. Town of Windham,
32 Conn. Supp. 271, 350
A.2d 785 (1975)
Delaware Hospitals Caring for the NONE
Indigent Sick
DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 29, §§ 7201 - 7204 (1983)
Public Assistance
DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 31, §§ 505, 517, 522 (1983 &
Supp. 1988)
PRIMARY INDIGENT CARE LAW
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEATLH
PRIMARY INDIGENT CARE LAW LEADING CASE LAW
District of Public Assistance General Spivey v. Barry, 501
Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. F.Supp. 1093 (D.D.C.
§§ 3-202 - 3-206 (1988) 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 665 F.2d 1222
(D.C. Cir. 1981)
Care for Indigent Sick Colomeris v. District of
D.C. CODE ANN. Columbia, 226 F.2d 266
§§ 32-123 - 32-125 (1988) (D.C. Cir. 1955)
Florida Health Care Responsibility Dade County v. American
for Indigents Hospital of Miami, 502
FLA. STAT. So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist.
§§ 154.301 - 154.331 Ct. App. 1987)
(Supp. 1988)
Cleary v. Dade County,
160 Fla. 892, 37 So. 2d
248 (1948)
Georgia Hospital Care for the Terrell County v. Albany/
Indigent Dougherty Hosp. Auth., 256
GA. CODE ANN. Ga. 627, 352 S.E.2d 378
§§ 31-8-1 - 31-846 (1985) (1987)
GA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 5 2(7)
Hospital Care for Non-
Resident Indigents
GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-8-30 - 31-8-36
(1985 & Supp. 1988)
Emergency Medical Services
to Pregnant Women in Labor
GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-842 (1985)
Hawaii General Assistance Keller v. Thompson, 56
State-Only Medicaid Haw. 183, 532 P2d 664
HAW. REV. STAT. (1975)
§§ 346-59, 346-71
(1986 & Supp. 1987)
HAw. CONsT. art. IX, §§ 1, 2, 3
STATE
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PRIMARY INDIGENT CARE LAW LEADING CASE LAW
Idaho Hospitals for Indigent Sick Intermountain Health
IDAHO CODE Care, Inc. v. Board of
§§ 31-3501 - 31-3519 Comm'rs, 109 Idaho 299,
(1984 & Supp. 1984) 707 P2d 410 (1985)
Illinois Aid to the Medically Indigent Lakeview Med. Center
ILL. ANN. STAT. v. Richardson,
ch. 23, paras. 7-1 - 7-6 76 Ill. App. 3d 953,
(Smith-Hurd 1988) 395 N.E. 2d 405 (1979)
Medical Assistance
ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 23, paras. 5-1 - 5-15
(Smith-Hurd 1988)
Indiana Hospital Care for the Welborn Memorial Baptist
Indigent Hosp. v. County Dep't
IND. CODE. ANN. of Welfare of Vanderburgh
§§ 12-5-6-1 - 12-5-6-20 County, 442 N.E.2d 372
(West 1983 & Supp. 1988) (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)
Iowa Medical & Surgical In re Fentress Estate,
Treatment of Indigent 249 Iowa 783, 89 N.W. 2d
Persons 357 (1959)
IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 255.1 - 255.30 Collins v. State Bd. of
(1985 & Supp. 1988) Social Welfare, 248 Iowa
369, 81 N.W.2d 4 (1957)
Kansas Medikan General Assistance State Dep't of Welfare
KAN. STAT. ANN. v. Dye, 204 Kan. 760, 466
§§ 39-701 - 39-709 (1982) P.2d 354 (1970)
KAN. CONST. art. VII, § 4
Kentucky NONE NONE
Louisiana State Charity Hospital
System
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:6
(West 1982 & Supp. 1988)
Muse v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co., 328
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PRIMARY INDIGENT CARE LAW LEADING CASE LAW
Maine Municipal General Assistance Blouin v. City of
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Rockland, 441 A.2d 1008
tit. 22, §§ 4300 - 4324 (Me. 1982)
(Supp. 1988)
Maryland Medical and Pharmacy Bayne v. Secretary of
Assistance Programs State, 283 Md. 560, 392
MD. HEALTH-GENERAL CODE ANN. A.2d 1008 (1978)
§§ 15-100 - 15-301
(1982 & Supp. 1989)
Massa- Commonwealth Liable to Sargent v. Comm'r of
chusetts Certain Individuals for Public Welfare, 383 Mass.
Expense of Hospital Care 808, 423 N.E.2d 755
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1981)
ch. 117, § 24A-21
(West 1975 & Supp. 1985)
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.
v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
1 Mass. App. 363, 297
N.E.2d 517 (1973)
Michigan Resident County Hospital- King v. Midland County
ization Program General Dep't of Social Serv's,
Assistance Medical 73 Mich. App. 253, 251
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. N.W.2d 270 (1977)
§§ 400.55, 400.58, & 400.66
(West 1988)
MICH. CONsT. art. IV,
§ 51
Minnesota General Assistance Act Beltrami County v.
MINN. STAT. ANN. Hennepin County, 264
§§ 256D.01 - 256D.21 Minn. 406, 119
(West 1982) N.W2d 25 (1963)
Medical Assistance for the Ramsey County v.
Needy Sherburne County, 281
MINN. STAT. ANN. N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1979)
§§ 256B.01 - 256B.73
(West 1982 & Supp. 1988)
Mississippi State Charity Hospitals
MIsS. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-11-1 - 41-11-91 (1981)
MIss. CONST. art. IV,
§ 86; art. XIV, § 262
Craig v. Mercy Hospital,
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Missouri General Relief Medical Lewis v. Shulimson, 400
Mo. ANN. STAT. F.Supp. 807 (E.D. Mo.
§§ 208.010 - 208.030 1975), affd,
(Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1989) 534 F.2d 794 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 940 (1977)
Montana General Relief Butte Community Union v.
MONT. CODE ANN. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309
§§ 53-2-321, 53-3-310 (Mont. 1986)
(1985)
MONT. CONST. art. 12, St. Patrick Hosp. v.
§ 3(1) & (3) Powell County, 156 Mont.
153, 477 P.2d 340 (1970)
Nebraska Paupers and Public Assistance Creighton-Omaha Regional
NEB. REv. STAT. Health Care Corp. v.
§§ 68-104 - 68-126 Douglas County, 202 Neb.
(1987) 686, 277 N.W.2d 64 (1979)
University of Nebraska Mary Lanning Hosp. v.
Hospital, Admission of Clay County, 107 Neb. 61,
Needy Patients 101 N.W2d 510
NEB. REV. STAT. (1960)
§ 85-172 (1987)
Nevada Hospital Care to Washoe County v.
Indigent Persons Wittenberg, 100 Nev. 143,
NEv. REV. STAT. 676 P.2d 808
§§ 428.000 - 428.345 (1984)
(1985)
New Aid to Assisted Persons Hall v. County of Hills-
Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. borough, 122 N.H. 448,
§§ 165:1-34 445 A.2d 1125 (1982)
(1978 & Supp. 1988)
New Jersey Financial Assistance to Sharp v. Dep't of
Certain Needy Persons Human Serv., 187 N.J.
N.J. STAT. ANN Super. 70, 453 A.2d 890
§§ 44: 8-104, 8-147 & 44:7-81 (1982)
(West Supp. 1989) Hudson County v.
Hernandez, 157 N.J.




JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEATLH
PRIMARY INDIGENT CARE LAW LEADING CASE LAW
New Mexico Indigent Hospital Claims Act Perez v. Dep't of Health
N.M. STAT. ANN. & Social Servs., 91 N.M.
§§ 27-5-1 - 27-5-18 (1985) 334, 573 P.2d 689 (1977)
Special Medical Needs Program
N.M. STAT. ANN.
88 27-4-1 - 27-4-5 (1985)
New York Medical Assistance for Graham v. Fahey, 90 A.D.
Needy Persons 2d 927, 457 N.Y.S.2d 922
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW (1982)
§8 363-369
(McKinney 1983) Montgomery County Dep't
of Social Serv. v. N.Y.
N.Y. CONST. art. VII, State Dep't of Social
§ 8; art. XVII, Serv's, 83 A.D.2d 684,
§ 1, 3, 4 442 N.YS.2d 251 (1981)
North General Assistance Graham v. Reserve Life
Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. Ins. Co., 274 N.C. 115,
§ 108A-24-108A-98, 161 S.E.2d 485 (1968)
88 153A-247-108A-260 (1987)
N.C. CONST. art. IX,
§4
Board of Managers v. City
of Wilmington, 237 N.C.
179, 74 S.E.2d 749 (1953)
North Medical Assistance Nielson v. Social Service
Dakota for Needy Persons Bd. of North Dakota, 216






§ 50-24.3-01 - 50-24.3-05
(Supp. 1987)
General Assistance Medical
OmIo REV. CODE ANN.
88 5113.01 - 5113.99
(Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1987)
St. Thomas Hosp. v.
Schmidt, 62 Ohio St. 2d
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Oklahoma Oklahoma Indigent Health Board of Comm'rs v. Enid
Care Act Springs Sanitarium &
OKLA. STAT. ANN. Hosp., 116 Okla. 249, 244
tit. 56, § 57-67 P2d 426 (1926)
(West 1987 & Supp. 1989)
Oregon Medical Assistance Smith v. Peet, 29 Or.
OR. REV. STAT. App. 625, 564 P 2d 1083
§§ 414.025 - 414.670 (1977)
(1987)
Pennsyl- Public Assistance Medical Price v. Cohen, 715 F. 2d
vania PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, 87 (3rd Cir. 1983),
§§ 444.1 - 447 cert. denied,
(Purdon Supp. 1989) 465 U.S. 1032 (1984)
Dearfield Hospital v.
Lininger, 3 Pa. D. & C. 3d
501 (1977)
Rhode Support of the Needy Roe v. Affleck, 120 R.I.
Island R.I. GEN. LAWS 679, 390 A.2d 361 (1978)
§§ 40-5-1 - 40-5-21
(1984)
Medical Assistance Carrillo v. Rohrer, 448
R.I. GEN. LAWS A.2d 1282 (R.I. 1982)
§§ 40-8-1 - 40-8-15 (1984)
South Medically Indigent NONE
Carolina Assistance Act
S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-6-150 - 44-6-200
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988)
S.C. CONST. art. XII,
§1
South County Poor Relief Sioux Valley Hosp.
Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. Ass'n v. Davison County,




S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 28-13A-1 - 28-13A-10 (1984)
STATE
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Tennessee Medical Assistance Act Jennings v. Davidson
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